For the better part of the past century, residential customers in the United States and many other countries have paid for electricity through a two-part tariff
that has collected most of the revenue through a flat volumetric charge--that is, flat electricity rates paid in cents per kilowatt hour (<t/ kWh).
The wholesale price contract, two-part tariff
contract, and reverse revenue sharing contract are most common.
For example, with a basic two-part tariff
, the regulator requires the company to set per-unit charges equal to marginal cost, yielding the efficient level of consumption and eliminating the deadweight loss associated with the monopoly.
Federated Wireless's suggestions to the FCC incorporate well-known two-part tariff
economic models to align financial incentives, protecting against the risk of spectrum warehousing.
Regarding its core activity - electricity transmission - FSK has a two-part tariff
consisting of a grid maintenance rate (RUB/MW per month), which is charged per MW of connected capacity, and a rate for electricity loss compensation (RUB/MWh), which is charged per MWh of normative technological loss of electricity in the transmission grid.
Let's now consider systems based on market price, dual pricing and the two-part tariff
The consumers' uncertainty potentially reduces their welfare and increases the firm's revenues, which are higher than those obtained with a two-part tariff
With the exception of Ordover and Panzar (1982), the firm setting the two-part tariff
in the standard pricing models has either monopsony or monopoly power, and so there are just two elasticities within each pricing equation.
a two-part tariff
with a fixed monthly fee of $10 and a constant,
The model also makes use of a two-part tariff
consisting of a fixed rate for Best Effort (BE) service, and a usage-sensitive rate structure for premium QoS.
However, an upstream monopoly can impose a two-part tariff
by choosing a franchise fee in such a way that all of the profit is extracted from the downstream firm.
In this paper we determine the conditions under which a channel-coordinating wholesale-price strategy will manufacturer-profit dominate a sophisticated Stackelberg two-part tariff
We show that the optimal policy is dependent on (1) the retailers, fixed costs, (2) the relative size of the retailers, and (3) the degree of inter-retailer competition.