The
supermajority provision of the state constitution - thanks to Proposition 13 - is all the protection that taxpayers have.
The
supermajority provision, insisted the Nevada high court, was merely a "procedural requirement that is general in nature.
The other
supermajority provision requires a two-thirds affirmative vote to remove a director prior to the next annual meeting and is a provision that can only be changed by a two-thirds affirmative vote.
UNITE HERE is asking Station Casinos shareholders to vote for proposals to change the
supermajority provision for amending the Company's bylaws, institute annual elections of directors, and allow shareholders to vote on the company's "poison pill" anti-takeover device.
This explanation would suggest that supermajority provisions identify those JVs that are more likely to perform poorly.
Model (2) indicates that supermajority provisions are negatively associated with JV performance in equally controlled JVs, but are positively associated with performance in JVs controlled by one of the partners.
Accordingly, states affected by these types of initiatives will have to consider new forms of revenue generation that will not be considered tax increases subject to
supermajority provisions, come to broad-based agreements to increase taxes that pass supermajority muster, or slash services as a way to close structural budget deficits.
923, 958 (2005) ("Although historical evidence presents no express rationale for the
supermajority provisions included in the Constitution, a more apt, albeit general, characterization is that they were intended to promote
While four studies found that classified board provisions, fair price provisions,
supermajority provisions and elimination of cumulative voting provisions have insignificant wealth effects (DeAngelo & Rice, 1983; Lauterback, Malitz, & Vu, 1991; Linn & McConnell, 1983; McWilliams, 1990), several other studies found support for the entrenchment hypothesis (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990; 1992; Bhagat & Brickley, 1984; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987; Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993; Mahoney, Sundaramurthy, & Mahoney, 1996).
Ayer's beneficial ownership of such a large voting interest was material information relevant to a shareholder's voting decision whether to approve the
supermajority provisions.
However, many states will have to overcome checks on the power to unilaterally increase taxes, including
supermajority provisions and in some cases, state constitutional prohibitions.
Eliminate
supermajority provisions for the removal of directors; and
