Clearly he cannot allow for this, since every consideration which led to the conclusion that affirmative judgements of taste are accompanied by harmonious free play is also a consideration met by any possible negative judgement of taste as well.
Now, if it can be shown that Kant considers this state of harmonious free play always to be pleasurable, it will follow that the only judgements of taste are those that involve pleasure (i.e.
Book One of Kant's Critique of Judgement (the `Analytic of the Beautiful') is an investigation of the judgement of taste about beauty--or, as Kant usually calls it, simply the judgement of taste.
The quoted remarks suggest perhaps that he regards the negative judgement as simply parallel to the affirmative, differing only with respect to whether the subject feels pleasure or pain, satisfaction or dissatisfaction.
The judgement of taste is therefore not a judgement of cognition, and is consequently not logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that whose determining ground can be no other than subjective.
The revelation of the third critique is the existence of an altogether different type of judgement, one that is not determinant.
In accordance with this conception of an aesthetic judgement, Kant distinguishes three non-compound kinds of aesthetic judgement concerning the merely material nature of an object or array of objects as this is apparent in perception, this nature being considered independently of what kind or kinds of object they are.
But a pure judgement of taste is not based on a concept of the object, in particular a concept of the object's purpose (or natural functions).
This is a judgement about an object as being an instance of kind K--a judgement that, when it assumes a certain form, might mistakenly be identified with a pure judgement of taste--the judgement that the object and its parts are in harmony with, or appropriate or well-suited to perform, the functions or purposes of things, or the parts of things,(16) of that kind--the judgement of qualitative perfection.
In addition to the previously mentioned non-compound kinds of aesthetic judgement, Kant acknowledges the combination of a pure judgement of taste about something with a judgement of qualitative perfection about that thing, the latter (as already indicated) being concerned with a concept of the kind that the object instantiates--the kind of thing it is or is meant to be.
The notion of qualitative perfection, as it figures in a judgement of dependent beauty, suffers from a number of obscurities.