Our measures of corruption capture self-reported occurrences of students bribing (1) to enter their institutions, (2) on exams, (3) for credit, or (4) to pass a term paper.
We hypothesize that perceptions of corruption itself will be a key explanatory variable for actual bribing behavior because, as argued in Cabelkova and Hanousek (2004), the willingness to bribe likely increases with the degree of corruption perceptions.
If education is perceived to perform a signaling mechanism in job search, the expected benefits of bribing are then higher.
Suppose this bribing competition takes the form of an English auction, and that law enforcers have some cost-of-lying denoted by [pi] (possibly because there is some small chance they will be indicted).
Assume that at this bribing competition stage any preceding cost of reporting (C) is sunk and does not reduce E's willingness to pay (our conclusions would be strengthened otherwise).
But if 2[F.sub.S] is larger than the cost [pi] law enforcers incur in lying, S will win the bribing game and E thus would not report to start with.
This especially true when it comes to corruption data, given the secrecy attached to bribing
. This is why we dealt with missing values using the multiple imputation method.
Bribing parties in traffic violation cases generally sought the
of bribing or is implicated by a middleman, this incentive is limited.
167 (1996) (creating a model to determine the payoffs of bribing
Next, it is easily shown that optimal strategies for A will involve bribing all legislators in a set [[z.sub.0], [Epsilon]] for some [z.sub.0] [element of] [- 1/2, [v.sup.-1](0)] and some [Epsilon] [greater than or equal to] 0.
If [W.sub.B] [less than or equal to] [integral of] v(z)dz [between limits] [v.sup.-1] and 0, then A can prevent B from invading without bribing any legislators.