Binding

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Binding

1. In printing, the process that collates and attaches pages to each other to create the finished book or periodical. Binding is also called the bindery line.

2. See: Binding a Tariff.

3. For insurance, see: Binding receipt.
References in periodicals archive ?
calibration of bindingness and flexibility that would lead to the most
(95) The immediate bindingness of the moral law can serve as the unquestionable foundation for a transcendental justification of a priori moral concepts because Kant holds that, on some level, everyone acknowledges moral obligation.
Beginning in the early 1990s, agencies have included boilerplate disclaimers of both the external enforceability and bindingness of their guidance documents.
In observing that the Guidelines retained some degree of legal "force as the framework for sentencing," the Court emphasized many of the key characteristics of bindingness noted above.
As we have seen, Ross (111) holds that this antinomy depends on the fact that our current understanding of the concept is ambiguous, and he attempts to dissolve (or neutralize) the antinomy by substituting an interpretation of the concept of a legal right, according to which this concept is conceived as a technical concept, for the dominating interpretation, according to which it is the concept of a unified entity that has the non-natural property of validity (or bindingness).
Column (2) shows that the results also hold if we use the fill rate as a measure of quota bindingness.
It is true that wacd has to be binding, but the purpose of bindingness of wacd is to avoid harm.
The bindingness hypothesis, see supra note 72, may also yield a necessary condition on a legal institution.
(72) Lawyers such as Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have adapted these realist insights to international law and international relations, and generally found the bindingness of international legal arrangements to be wanting in a world where states constantly compete.
Against this, as Stern shows in some fine pages analyzing Kant's references to God in the Groundwork and elsewhere, Kant wants to establish that the bindingness of morality "must be seen to come from our reason" itself (62).
This challenge concerns the reconciliation of two of the theory's features: on the one hand, its dependence on a pre-rational choice (the "choice to live"), and on the other hand, its objectivity and bindingness. I will refer to the tension between these two features as "the problem of subjectivity." I then (Section 4) examine four different attempts to solve this problem.