Redundant tariffs ex ante are also more likely if the mean world price and domestic autarky price are close together, as would be the case for industries on the margin between exporting and import competing (this paper's case).
Since "liberalization" pressure may lead in some instances to the replacement of zero quotas by redundant tariffs, this "tariffication" process may initially increase the frequency with which we observe redundant protection.
Yet redundant tariff protection (also called "water-in-the-tariff") is a common feature of 19th and early 20th century U.S.
As an additional political inducement, specific tariffs are less transparent to consumers since the effective rate of protection is more difficult to discern.(4) In its current incarnation in developing economies, redundant tariff protection works in much the same way.
I show how redundant tariff protection emerges from both pluralist (passive state) and more autocratic (active state) political economy models.
Since redundant tariff protection can occur in pluralistic political environments (19th century U.S.) and in more autocratic ones (many modern LDCs), the model must be closed in ways that reflect these varying initial circumstances.
World price uncertainty creates expected gains from redundant tariff protection for risk-neutral producer interests and policy makers.
Often the redundant tariff is combined with a zero quota to create an additional layer of redundancy in case "liberalization" pressure requires the elimination of one variety of protection.
Since my purpose is to show the logic behind redundant tariff protection I opt for the simplest plausible structure consistent with that goal.