The homeland security approach to develop protective measures against CBRN incidents is based on the DOD passive defense construct, assuming that terrorists will use military-style NBC weapons
to simultaneously cause mass casualties in multiple cities.
Throughout history, a military's ability to employ NBC weapons
was directly affected by the operational concepts of the day, the national leadership's willingness to employ such agents, and the technical ability to deliver these weapons against an adversary or noncombatant target.
In the mid-1990s, the primary threat posed by NBC weapons
to the United States shifted from an all-out U.S.-Russian strategic exchange to less overwhelming, but more numerous and perhaps less predictable threats.
The assessment of likely Iraqi use of NBC weapons
was found in early drafts of the September dossier by JIC Chair John Scarlett.
The book's most problematic contribution is by David Kay, who recently resigned as head of the Iraq Survey Group searching for evidence of that country's pre-war NBC weapons
One therefore has to wonder whether Falkenrath et al's call for $1 billion to be allocated annually to deal with the NBC terrorist and covert attack threat will really help matters or make them worse by pumping more money into an already oversized NBC weapons
with NBC weapons
, attack by unconventional delivery means, such as terrorism, is possible.
It assumed that nuclear weapons are only one of the capabilities that can address threats from proliferation of NBC weapons
and ballistic missiles.
As a consequence, it is important to think more carefully about how states and nonstate actors may actually use NBC weapons
. The approach here is to examine how our thinking about adversary use has evolved in the last decade and the implications this evolution has had.
Thus, while arms-control and export-control regimes can be helpful in retarding and raising the cost of obtaining NBC weapons
, states that are sufficiently motivated and possess adequate resources will probably succeed if they persist.
The term consequence management, under the counterproliferation strategy, addresses both the long-term remediation of contaminated terrain and military equipment to preincident conditions and support to coalition allies whose governments request official US military support to respond to the use of NBC weapons
in their country.
This leads to the postulate that the more limited the probability of detection--or stated differently, the easier it is to mask or hide an NBC weapons
capability--the less "deterrence" is gained from traditional measures such as mandatory declarations, and intrusive challenge inspections.