12) This national strategy declared that terrorist groups were pursing WMD capabilities through "rogue states" that were developing or had the capability to produce NBC weapons
The third generation peaked with the use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and continued with four decades of arms control efforts attempting to restrict and roll back the use of NBC weapons
against both combatants and noncombatants.
In the mid-1990s, the primary threat posed by NBC weapons
to the United States shifted from an all-out U.
The assessment of likely Iraqi use of NBC weapons
was found in early drafts of the September dossier by JIC Chair John Scarlett.
Since Ultimate Security was published in late 2003, three dramatic developments have occurred: the failure to find NBC weapons
in Iraq, calling into question the administration's rationale for preemptive war; Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, raising hopes that proliferation in the Middle East region might be reversed; and the revelation that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.
One therefore has to wonder whether Falkenrath et al's call for $1 billion to be allocated annually to deal with the NBC terrorist and covert attack threat will really help matters or make them worse by pumping more money into an already oversized NBC weapons
with NBC weapons
, attack by unconventional delivery means, such as terrorism, is possible.
It assumed that nuclear weapons are only one of the capabilities that can address threats from proliferation of NBC weapons
and ballistic missiles.
As a consequence, it is important to think more carefully about how states and nonstate actors may actually use NBC weapons
Thus, while arms-control and export-control regimes can be helpful in retarding and raising the cost of obtaining NBC weapons
, states that are sufficiently motivated and possess adequate resources will probably succeed if they persist.
Prior to 1991, NBC defense was an aspect of deterring superpowers from using NBC weapons
and protecting military forces in the event that deterrence failed.
This leads to the postulate that the more limited the probability of detection--or stated differently, the easier it is to mask or hide an NBC weapons
capability--the less "deterrence" is gained from traditional measures such as mandatory declarations, and intrusive challenge inspections.