Even though there is, as yet, no definitive answer to this question, substantial leverage can be gained by using a case study of Indonesia, a country that transitioned from a developmental autocracy to a more majoritarian democracy, to identify the most likely causal mechanisms linking adoption of majoritarian institutions to growth-enhancing policies.
Although there has been some backsliding on trade policy reform, especially by the Ministry of Trade (Bird, Hill, and Culbertson 2008, 955-957), on the whole democratic governments in Indonesia, particularly after the emergence in 2005 of a more majoritarian democracy, have been able to sustain a trade liberalization program begun in the mid-1980s.
As a result, the political shift from developmental autocracy to majoritarian democracy in these polities has occurred without a significant slowdown in economic growth.
Given that such cycling is understood a priori to be a likely consequence of majoritarian democracy, ruling majority coalition members may calculate that future majority coalition members may discriminate against them.
These conclusions may not have relevance to a nascent majoritarian democracy in transition from socialism to capitalism.
However, although neither the rotating solution of pure distribution games nor electoral rotation is relevant to real-life redistribution under majoritarian democracy and there is no cycle, still it is always the same half of society that it is exploited by the other half.
If rules applied in politics were general, some of the worst features of majoritarian democracy would be purged or at least greatly mitigated.