It is easy to see that the above IBRS scheme is correct, because [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
The above RSA-based IBRS scheme is anonymous against full key exposure.
A simulator sets up all parameters correctly as defined in the proposed IBRS scheme.
1], V) is generated according to the signing method of the proposed IBRS scheme.
The above RSA-based IBRS scheme is existentially unforgeable under CMIA attacks under the hardness of the RSA problem.
We show that the security of the proposed IBRS scheme is reduced to the hardness of the RSA problem.
Therefore, if the forger F who can break our IBRS scheme exists, then a poly-time solver to the RSA problem in [G.
The second pairing-based IBRS scheme is described as follows.
The above pairing-based IBRS scheme is unconditionally anonymous against full key exposure.
The above pairing-based IBRS scheme is existentially unforgeable under CMIA attacks under the hardness of the computational DH problem.
We want to build an algorithm A that uses a forger F against our pairing-based IBRS scheme to solve the CDH problem.
Therefore, if a forger F who can break our IBRS scheme exists, then a poly-time solver to the CDH problem in [G.
