But this would leave Owner with an

expected payoff of 2*100 - 54 - 30 =

Even when [V.sub.A] = [V.sub.B] = L < [V.sub.C], and even though this generates a free-rider problem inside the alliance, the members of the alliance achieve a positive

expected payoff. The intuition behind this result is that players benefit from the possibility to free-ride within the alliance.

However, the English rule favors strong patent holders'

expected payoff, which may in turn increase R&D efforts (if the patent strength is positively correlated to its inventiveness).

Hence, the union or the firm may choose to hold out even if the

expected payoff from holding out or conceding in a mixed-strategy equilibrium is less than the payoff when both concede.

producing smaller responses [q*.sub.i] = [q*.sub.j] = (w + 1)/(2 N + 1) and smaller

expected payoff [[pi]*.sub.i] = [(w +1).sup.2] /[(2N+1).sup.2] than the ones in the simple game.

where [E.sub.[theta],[epsilon]] denotes the expectation taken with respect to the densities h ([theta]) and g ([epsilon]) : In the next relevant subgame, the firm chooses its strategy [x.sup.*] ([omega]) anticipating the interest [R.sup.*] and the choices of intervention and resolution [[sigma].sup.*.sub.F] and [[sigma].sup.*.sub.P], and again using [pi] (X) to calculate their

expected payoffs:

In the preceding sections, I employ the offer terms stated in Microsoft's letter to the Yahoo board at face value and use them in the formation of the

expected payoff to Yahoo if the merger goes through as in Equation (1).

where [E.sub.i] ([[alpha].sub.i], [[alpha].sub.-i]) is player i's

expected payoff given by mixed-strategy profile a in game [alpha] be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of game G'.

Negotiators for both the Obama administration and the European Union say the

expected payoff of the TTIP agreement is job creation and economic growth.

Why consumers shouldn't expect companies to be perfect Companies engage selectively with CSR issues based on their priorities and the

expected payoff, says marketing professor Americus Reed.

The

expected payoff for player 1 in state (1,1) is simulated using Table 3 with parameters [R.sub.i], [S.sub.i], P and T, which represent different payoffs gained by the nodes in different strategies.