Copeland and Friedman [1987; 1991] provide useful background information on laboratory procedures and computerized double auction markets.
Friedman  offers a partial analysis of simple double auction markets as games of complete information, and concludes that in Nash equilibrium satisfying a renegotiation-proofness condition, at worst only a single (and least valuable) trade will remain unrealized.
To analyze the situation faced by traders as a game of incomplete information is a daunting task, particularly in the case of double auction markets (and clearinghouse markets with book [is greater than] 0) since continuous-time strategies then must be chosen.
In double auction markets, the difference between the best (lowest) ask and the best (highest) bid is recalculated every time either changes, and spread is the time-weighted average over the time when both bids and asks are present during a subperiod.
The rest of Table V reports similar results for double auction markets.
Early studies of double auction markets for perishables (e.
Such considerations, combined with early evidence from experimental posted offer markets, led Smith [1982,177] to posit that the Hayek Hypothesis generally performs better in double auction markets than in posted offer markets.
Examination of the four double auction experiments in Figure 2 reveals that our double auction markets generated price deviations of approximately the same magnitude as HLV.
This result parallels HLV's finding for double auction markets in the SMP design.
Similarly, little evidence of the exercise of market power through strategic withholding is evident in three of the four double auction markets (DA2, DAX1 and DA1).
These results parallel HLV's findings in double auction markets.