Second, for purposes of the article, a developed country is defined as a country with, and a developing country as a country without, a functioning antitrust regime.
Can the domestic authorities of a developed country fill the gap of regulation in a developing country?
While actual supplanting antitrust as such appears like a novel idea, (24) the use of developed country antitrust expertise and actors for developing countries is not unusual.
(29) In her proposal, after a decision has been made in a developed country, a local plaintiff in the developing country need not prove existence of the cartel but only the local elements of the offense, as well as some procedural requirements concerning the recognized decision.
The idea is that a developed country's antitrust agencies and courts assert jurisdiction over cartels that have some or even all of their effect in a less developed country, even in the absence of a treaty that allows for it, and even in the absence of a request by the developing country.
(49) The situation in which the less developed country has no functioning antitrust regime can be viewed as such a situation--the developing country has no law that it could want to be applied and therefore no interest in the sense of interest analysis.
If developing countries have different antitrust laws, their interests would often be better served if those laws were applied rather than those of the developed country.
Everything else being equal, it is preferable if a developing country regulates its own economy by itself, rather than for a developed country to do so in its stead.
(54) The case is easiest where the cartel significantly affects the developed country itself.
Where conflicts exist, supplanting antitrust appears problematic, unless the institutions of the developed country are willing to adopt the policies of the developing country by applying its law.
Should, the antitrust law and enforcement institutions of a developed country supplant those of other countries in multinational cartel cases?
Thus, in the absence of such an institution, the question remains whether centralization can take place through the institutions of one of the affected countries, in particular of a developed country. Central regulation of the entire cartel by one developed country could be viewed as a stark example of positive comity.