Both Cournot and Bertrand duopoly
models start from the hypothesis of duopoly being "energized" through existence of active competition relationships between respective (two) firms, which manifest in an active and visible manner between following limits: (A) in Cournot model, firms compete each other on basis of variation of quantity of sold products (either good or services), resulting in (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2004): a) stable profits--for both firms--, which, while smaller than monopoly profits, are larger than profits earned in perfect competition environment; b) a long-term equilibrium of resulted duopoly--since neither firm can, or will, gain the upper hand in competition "war" by means of altering (i.e.
 analyzed the dynamics of a Bertrand duopoly
with products which become divided.
model is frequently used when the competitive behaviors are discussed in proper research.
It is well known that Bertrand duopoly
competition game is one of the basic oligopoly games with two players.
Keser (1993) experimentally studies a repeated Bertrand duopoly
game with asymmetric costs and "demand inertia." She reports a tendency toward more cooperative behavior when participants are experienced with the game.
11:30 A NEW BERTRAND DUOPOLY
GAME AND ITS DYNAMICAL BEHAVIORS
Due to the effectiveness of the e-learning techniques used in teaching of Bertrand duopoly
, this section briefly introduces the methods used in the classroom.
exceed those under free competition) rather than Bertrand duopoly
In "Complex Dynamics and Chaos Control on a kind of Bertrand Duopoly
Game Model Considering R&D Activities," H.
One can see that the form of this dynamical system is so different from the previous classical Cournot and Bertrand duopoly
game with bounded rationality.