Bertrand duopoly

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Bertrand Duopoly

One of two major models of how duopolies operate. In the Bertrand model, two companies compete with each other for the lowest possible price, resulting in perfect competition. Bertrand duopoly is applicable in many circumstances but it does not express duopolistic behavior perfectly. See also: Cournot model.

Bertrand duopoly

see DUOPOLY.
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Blume (2003) examines Bertrand competition with continuous strategy space, homogenous products, and different marginal costs and shows that for small enough [eta] > 0, the following is an equilibrium: The low-cost firm posts a price equal to [c.
One strategy is price competition which is often defined as Bertrand competition in economics literature.
THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF FIRMS UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION
Under Bertrand competition, firms take the prices of rivals as given.
For some time now, prominent antitrust economists have advocated models of differentiated Bertrand competition, which appear to imply that merger of a subset of competitors necessarily raises price, or have made general statements that differentiated Bertrand competition implies that merger of a subset of competitors always raises price.
Almost without exception in current industrial organization literature, market rivalry involving quantity strategies is referred to as Cournot competition and market rivalry involving price strategies is referred to as Bertrand competition.
Lewis (2010)--in an earlier version of this study--and Colciago (2013) discuss supply-side complementarities, contrasting CES demand with Cournot and/or Bertrand competition.
the lack of downstream regulation, Bertrand competition in the downstream market, downstream market price elasticities on the order of 2.
Further, it is in the context of Bertrand competition for undifferentiated products that ECPR can be proved to be efficient under extremely restrictive assumptions.
Cournot Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes.
BERTRAND COMPETITION TO show that entry by even an inefficient rival could yield socially beneficial results, we assume that the monopolist is restricted (e.
Section III identifies the properties of spatial prices under Bertrand competition while section IV uncovers the behavioral determinants of single basing-point pricing.