The new country lurched from coup to coup until Hafez al-Asad, Bashar al-Asad's father, consolidated his rule over Syria in 1970.8 Hafez al-Asad offered a new identity and bargain through a secular ideology of pan-Arab socialism called
Ba'athism. Today, the regime's bargain remains.
Since dismantling Saddam's version of
Ba'athism, which many viewed as a cover for Sunni-minority rule, Iraq's Shia leaders have done little to soften the blow-an approach that has not gone unnoticed elsewhere in the region.
Hill asserts that sectarianism had been present in the region the entire time; however, the rulers, as in the case of
Ba'athism in Iraq, had resorted to policies mainly focusing on civic identity so as to bar sectarianism and to preserve Iraq.
Another sub-section on the Ba'ath party is interestingly missing a basic definition of
Ba'athism itself.
In the collaborative management of the region by the Saudis and the West in pursuit of the many western projects (countering socialism,
Ba'athism, Nasserism, Soviet and Iranian influence), western politicians have highlighted their chosen reading of Saudi Arabia (wealth, modernization and influence), but they chose to ignore the Wahhabist impulse.
In Iraq, that concept was
Ba'athism. And while it was more identified with the Sunni minority than with the Shiite majority, it endured for decades as a vehicle for national unity.
But de-Ba'athification ended up targeting anyone who ever had ties to
Ba'athism, something far beyond what the occupying armies attempted in Germany.
On Syria's Alawis For those Alawis who have no alternative ideology or self-identification, the fall of
Ba'athism is unthinkable.
It broadly remains the cradle of the Pan Arab ideal of
Ba'athism, standing alone, since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.
Ba'athism, its Near Eastern alter ego, likewise became a victim of the personal rivalry between Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Hafez al Assad of Syria, both, it should be noted, minority leaders in their own countries whose own communities enjoyed a high degree of favour under British and French rule respectively.
In light of the attacks targeting Christians in Iraq and Egypt, Geagea said that "no one can threaten Christians in Lebanon except Christians themselves especially when there are some (Christian) leaders who do not posses any strategic vision and their way of thinking revolves around their own direct political interests." Geagea said that a second danger which might pose a threat to the Christians in Lebanon "is the way Syrians view Lebanon, especially that it is driven by the residues of old
Ba'athism and Nationalism which consider Lebanon not an independent entity but part of Syria."
The division between those who stayed and those who fled was exacerbated by the politicised and opportunist use of accusations of '
Ba'athism', frequently deployed by returning politicians against those who disagreed or opposed them.
