Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures
, 39 J.
We employ a comprehensive measure of corporate governance that encompasses those governance mechanisms that have received the most attention in the academic literature, namely, board and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics, compensation, insider ownership, transparency, and antitakeover measures
307) See Coates, supra note 6, at 291-97, 306-10, 328-36 (providing evidence that pill adoptions do not affect bids, that poison pills do not correlate with other firm traits, and that certain other antitakeover measures
have not been shown to affect bids).
Rights agreements are popular antitakeover measures
, but the price at which the shareholder may purchase additional shares in the case of a takeover is usually set below or close to the market price.
Regan, "Dead End: Delaware's Response to the Recent Innovation in Corporate Antitakeover Measures
, the So-Called 'Dead Hand' Poison Pill, in Carmody v.
to oppose its adoption of antitakeover measures
, reduced shares in five Japanese firms, while increasing equity in two firms.
Whether the topic is executive compensation, majority voting for directors, or antitakeover measures
, the influence of shareholders on corporate policymaking is definitely on the rise.
One of the intermediate standards applies where boards adopt antitakeover measures
While the existing literature reports conflicting findings concerning the relationship between the inside/outside director dichotomy and the adoption of antitakeover measures
, consistent with agency theory we propose:
, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder interests.
Both LBOs and LRs are antitakeover measures
in that they can be motivated by the threat of a takeover by outsiders.
Alternatively, Comment and Schwert (1995) state that antitakeover measures
are unlikely to alter a firm's probability of being acquired and are not a significant tool for management to entrench and protect themselves.