bilateral oligopoly

bilateral oligopoly

a market situation with a significant degree of seller concentration (like OLIGOPOLY) and a significant degree of buyer concentration (like OLIGOPSONY). See COUNTERVAILING POWER.
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The primary reason to have an MFN is that it helps to enforce the bilateral oligopoly.
Bilateral oligopoly models, on the other hand, have been used extensively in the trade union literature to model the bargaining activity by unions aimed at extracting firms' rents, generated in the final market (see Pencavel, 1991, and Booth, 1995, for recent surveys).
Indeed, their model of bilateral oligopoly predicts a positive relationship between final retail prices and the degree of differentiation between retailers, for any given number of retailers.
between trading parties as arising in a bilateral monopoly or bilateral oligopoly situation.
When you have a bilateral oligopoly you have an interesting market structure that we know very little about.
In this paper, we address the problem of measuring market power in bilateral oligopoly.
We will see that the easiest way to ensure that the alternative equilibrium concepts for the bilateral oligopoly model do possess empirically distinguishable comparative static properties, and that the degrees of market power are identified within each, is to employ a device very closely parallel to the Bresnahan solution to the identification problem in the oligopoly case: Allow the sellers' marginal cost to rotate (not merely shift) with changes in exogenous variables.
The larger contribution of this paper stems from its findings pertaining to a specific bilateral oligopoly application.
In those areas, bilateral oligopoly, not price leadership or rigid prices, appears to prevail.
While the existence of a bilateral oligopoly increases the risk of supply or outlet disruption, high capital intensity and high fixed costs increase the costs of any production disruption because of the magnitude of both cash and opportunity costs incurred during the interruption.
These sellers invariably claim that large buyers, or buyer groups, take unfair advantage of their size to compel small suppliers to accept ever shrinking margins, forcing many of them to leave the market, setting the stage for bilateral oligopoly, raising rivals' costs and harming consumers in the process.

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