Part (c) suggests that the defense of attractive nuisance is only available to a certain type of child.
In interpreting the attractive nuisance doctrine in the context of the model presented in the following section, condition (c) is key.
The attractive nuisance doctrine acts as a hybrid rule, applying a no-liability rule with accidents involving a low-cost child, and a negligence rule with accidents involving a high-cost child.
With due care positive for the low-cost child and the landowner but zero for the high-cost child, the attractive nuisance doctrine is efficient with respect to care.
If the attractive nuisance doctrine is applied in this setting to protect the high-cost child, the courts will find the landowner nonnegligent and therefore not liable.
But if attractive nuisance is used as a defense for the high-cost child only, the landowner's expected liability is (1 - [alpha])[p.
Precisely why the attractive nuisance doctrine fails when (3) minimizes social loss can best be illustrated with a specific setting in which by choosing Care, the landowner can completely prevent an accident (i.
Attractive nuisance fails, then, when (3) is the social loss minimum and B > (1- [alpha])[p.
Attractive nuisance, however, will involve some court costs even if all the parties and the courts have perfect information.
It has been argued in this article that attractive nuisance acts as a hybrid liability rule--the landowner faces no liability with accidents involving a low-cost child but faces the negligence rule with accidents involving a high-cost child.
Attractive nuisance also involves information costs, but to the extent that it is easy to distinguish between low-cost and high-cost children, further information costs of using attractive nuisance are only incurred with accidents involving a high-cost child.
Where attractive nuisance fails is when it is efficient for the landowner to choose Care and it is efficient for both the low-cost and high-cost child to choose No Care.