attractive nuisance

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Attractive Nuisance

A feature, especially a dangerous one, on a property that outsiders may be encouraged to abuse, perhaps to their detriment. For example, a trespasser may be tempted to jump off a bridge into a pond. Property owners generally have the responsibility to take reasonable measure to prevent attractive nuisances from being mistreated.

attractive nuisance

A concept in tort law holding that if a person creates or allows a condition to exist on his or her property that a reasonably prudent person would know presents a danger to children, then that person must take steps to protect children of tender years from the condition, especially if it is something known to be attractive to small children.Liability can also be imposed if someone creates such a condition on someone else's property or even in a public place. Examples would be a swimming pool on one's own property,a rope swing installed by a private individual over a pond in a public park,or even an old refrigerator dumped by the side of the road in a rural area,but which could trap and suffocate children inside.Many courts hold that an artificial body of water,such as a pool,is an attractive nuisance but a natural one,such as a pond,is not.

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Part (c) suggests that the defense of attractive nuisance is only available to a certain type of child.
In interpreting the attractive nuisance doctrine in the context of the model presented in the following section, condition (c) is key.
The attractive nuisance doctrine acts as a hybrid rule, applying a no-liability rule with accidents involving a low-cost child, and a negligence rule with accidents involving a high-cost child.
With due care positive for the low-cost child and the landowner but zero for the high-cost child, the attractive nuisance doctrine is efficient with respect to care.
If the attractive nuisance doctrine is applied in this setting to protect the high-cost child, the courts will find the landowner nonnegligent and therefore not liable.
But if attractive nuisance is used as a defense for the high-cost child only, the landowner's expected liability is (1 - [alpha])[p.
Precisely why the attractive nuisance doctrine fails when (3) minimizes social loss can best be illustrated with a specific setting in which by choosing Care, the landowner can completely prevent an accident (i.
Attractive nuisance fails, then, when (3) is the social loss minimum and B > (1- [alpha])[p.
Attractive nuisance, however, will involve some court costs even if all the parties and the courts have perfect information.
It has been argued in this article that attractive nuisance acts as a hybrid liability rule--the landowner faces no liability with accidents involving a low-cost child but faces the negligence rule with accidents involving a high-cost child.
Attractive nuisance also involves information costs, but to the extent that it is easy to distinguish between low-cost and high-cost children, further information costs of using attractive nuisance are only incurred with accidents involving a high-cost child.
Where attractive nuisance fails is when it is efficient for the landowner to choose Care and it is efficient for both the low-cost and high-cost child to choose No Care.