Cartels are usually established either to exploit the joint marketing power of suppliers to extract MONOPOLY profits, or as a means of preventing cutthroat competition from forcing firms to operate at a loss, often resorted to in times of depressed demand (a so-called ‘crisis cartel’).
A number of factors are crucial to the successful operation of a cartel, in particular the participation of all significant suppliers of the product and their full compliance with the policies of the cartel. Nonparticipation of some key suppliers and ‘cheating’ by cartel members, together with the ability of buyers to switch to substitute products, may well serve to undermine a cartel's ability to control prices. In many countries, most notably the US, UK and EUROPEAN UNION, cartels concerned with price fixing, market sharing and restrictions on production and capacity are prohibited by law. See COMPETITION POLICY, ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC).
Quotas of QA and QB are given to firms A and B respectively where a horizontal line drawn from the intersection of MR and XMC (the line of aggregate marginal costs) intersects MCA and MCB. Profit contributed by each firm is computed by multiplying the number of units produced by the difference between industry price and the firm's average cost at that level of output. The aggregate profit is then divided among the member firms in some agreed manner, not necessarily, it is to be noted, in the same proportion as actually contributed by each of the individual firms. Disputes over the sharing of aggregate profit frequently lead to the break-up of cartels.
Cartels are usually established with the purpose of either exploiting the joint market power of suppliers to extract MONOPOLY profits or as a means of preventing cut-throat competition from forcing firms to operate at a loss, often resorted to in times of depressed demand (a so-called ‘crisis cartel’). In the former case, a central administration agency could determine the price and output of the industry, and the output quotas of each of the separate member firms, in such a way as to restrict total industry output and maximize the joint profits of the group. Price and output will thus tend to approximate those of a profit-maximizing monopolist. See Fig. 21 .
A number of factors are crucial to the successful operation of a cartel, in particular the participation of all significant suppliers of the product and their full compliance with the policies of the cartel. Non-participation of some key suppliers and ‘cheating’ by cartel members, together with the ability of buyers to switch to substitute products, may well serve to undermine a cartel's ability to control prices. In many countries, including the UK, the USA and the European Union, cartels concerned with price fixing, market sharing and restrictions on production and capacity are prohibited by law. See COMPETITION POLICY (UK), COMPETITION POLICY (EU), ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM-EXPORTING COUNTRIES ( OPEC).