Median Voter

Median Voter

The theoretical person who is precisely in the middle of the political spectrum of his/her community. That is, the median voter's political views are equidistant from both the most right-wing and the most left-wing person in his community. In electoral politics, it is thought that the median voter (or group of median voters) tips the election to one candidate or the other. As a result, many politicians seek to appear to be moderate prior to an election.
References in periodicals archive ?
In Downs's theory the median voter is the one between the parties who likes to think himself "independent" and is in fact probably merely apathetic or ignorant or both.
Since political majorities (or the median voter, the marginal member of the majority) can force political minorities to fund programs yielding benefits for the majority, government will tend to be larger than that observed under a rule of unanimity, and the expansion in the number of concentrated interest groups can result in the growth of government relative to the economy as a whole.
For presidents, the median voter is the median of median voters, almost by definition more moderate than median voters in districts throughout the country.
In this paper we both replicate and update an important paper in the median voter model literature in order to see how the empirical model holds up nearly thirty years later.
For instance, Roemer and Silvestre (2002) indicate the single-policy-dimension and median voter framework in the previous studies.
In accordance with the median voter model, we identified a number of demographic indicators to describe voter preferences in each district averaged from years 2009-2013, such as the population of children, median income, and foreign-born population.
The biggest political donors aren't just wealthier than the median voter.
At the very most, it may have hinted that she was vacillating, or appeared to be so in an attempt perhaps to win over the median voter.
A concept from economics called the median voter theorem provides one explanation for this wobbliness.
By influencing elderly homeowners' preferred local tax rates, targeted tax-price reductions may shift the identity of the local median voter and thus moderate how changes in demographics affect local public revenue.
The median voter might be expected to vote for higher taxes on the wealthiest 1%, or even the wealthiest 25%, because this voter has absorbed the idea that she is unlikely to find herself in this group in the near future.