Bayesian Probability

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Bayesian Probability

A revision of a previous probability based on new information. In Bayesian analysis, one makes mathematical assumptions about unavailable information. As that information is gathered and disseminated, the Bayesian probability corrects or replaces the assumptions and alters its results accordingly.
References in periodicals archive ?
The article demonstrates that the distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability can be drawn, and operationalized, at every level of description.
Epistemic probability distributions assigned to elements of fire risk are specified and propagated though models of the multi-attribute selection by means of Monte Carlo simulation.
There is an important difference between giving each person the greatest equal epistemic probability of surviving and giving each the greatest equal chance of surviving.
In the case Bradley describes, Batman can afford each person a two-thirds epistemic probability of surviving at 1 p.
is either to give each the greatest equal epistemic probability of surviving or to give each the greatest equal chance of surviving.
11) It would be an odd moral position for Batman to take that it is permissible to knowingly afford C no objective probability of surviving a particular situation, so long as he gives Alice, Bob and Carol a reasonable epistemic probability of surviving.
It is easy to let the intuition that Batman ought to save the larger number mislead you into thinking that he ought to provide each the greatest epistemic probability of being saved.
This paper argues for a doctrine it calls "infallibilism," which is stipulated to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1.
Once more, Alston takes a keen-edged scalpel to various central issues such as externalism versus internalism, reliabilism, foundationalism, coherence, truth-conduciveness, epistemic virtue, skepticism, contextualism (though Alston means something different by it than the view now widely disputed in the literature), and epistemic probability.
It is at least conceivable that we could justify our belief that memory is reliable without relying on anything but introspective knowledge of "memory" states and a priori knowledge of epistemic probability relations (if such a priori knowledge is possible).
The chapters that follow discuss the epistemology of self-knowledge, memory, other persons, testimony, perception, and induction, as well epistemic probability and a priori knowledge.