Determinism

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Determinism

Fully ordained in advance. A deterministic chaos system is one that gives random looking results, even though the results are generated from a system of equations.

Determinism

In economics, the theory that occurrences are caused directly by other occurrences, and that economic agency by individuals plays little or no role. For example, a company's success occurs because social and economic pressures cause its products to be demanded, and not because of any marketing strategy its management devises. Determinism is associated with Karl Marx, who believed in the importance of historical analysis in explaining economic phenomena. However, some Marxist analysts have rejected that Marx taught economic determinism.
References in periodicals archive ?
In contrast, under causal determinism, no one need be responsible for the background conditions.
Even though the ancient Stoics, from Chrysippus onward, were committed, by other things they affirmed, to the truth of what we call causal determinism, the issues they explicitly faced in reconciling their thesis of late with responsibility for action have very little to do with these specific commitments.
Notice that whether the person acts freely or unfreely in Watson's account, as in Frankfurt's account, is completely independent of causal determinism.
But now, focus our attention on the fact that causal determinism might be true.
Part 3 commences its discussion of Aquinas's riposte to causal determinism by explaining his modal semantics of the necessary, contingent, possible, and impossible.
Essentially, the main reasons come down to: (1) Science shows that causal determinism is true, and (2) Reflective common sense shows that causal determinism is true.
This becomes evident, for example, in her notion of causal determinism which seems too closely tied to the notion of mechanical force.
Dialogue eleven, on freedom, determinism and responsibility, examines whether human freedom is compatible with causal determinism, and relates this debate to questions of responsibility; namely, if a person's actions are determined in some way, then in what sense can that person be held responsible for them?
9] Strawson attempts to explain the intelligibility of ascriptions of moral responsibility given the possibility of causal determinism.
The author replies to the challenges to Frankfurt-style compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility presented in Daniel Speak's paper "The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument.
They argue, more contentiously, that these examples show that the kind of control that grounds moral responsibility is what they call "guidance control," which "consists in the action's issuing from the agent's own, moderately reasons-responsive mechanism" and that the truth of the thesis of causal determinism would not show that agents fail to exercise guidance control of their actions.
Most of the traditional defenses for compatibilism center on the claim that free will (or autonomy) and causal determinism in the explanation of human behavior or choices are logically or metaphysically compatible.