The direct effects of compensation, monitoring, and blockholders
on the corporate governance factor are negative and the direct effect between corporate governance and risk taking is positive.
Using their prospectuses, we retrieved the IPO date, the subscription price, the number of shares on sale in the IPO, the number of shares issued in and outstanding after the IPO, the IPO allocation mechanism, the underwriters' identity, the involvement of venture capitalists, and the percentage of shares held by the managers, members of their families, and blockholders
before and after the IPO.
controlled, and these blockholders
support management, institutional
Given that long-term shareholders are the investors most likely to benefit from costly price-boosting manipulation around equity issuances, it is not surprising that firms with large shareholders (which tend to be long-term shareholders) are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation around equity offerings than firms without such blockholders
192) Thus, the Williams Act reflects a deliberate decision by Congress to balance the interests of outside blockholders
and incumbent managers.
Thus, no significant association is found between the equity stakes of blockholders
(like venture capitalists and angel investors) who do not have board seats, and liquidity.
This result is consistent with the notion that external blockholders
play an important corporate governance role to reduce excessive CEO compensation levels in firms run by powerful CEOs.
Thus, some institutional investors and family blockholders
have gained power by increasing their activism (David et al.
Employee stock ownership plans, firm performance, and monitoring by outside blockholders
on equity, Profit, Market value of equity, Tangible book value/Assets, Leverage, Long term debt/Total assets, Projected benefit obligation- pension plan assets/Total assets, Volatility of earnings Ashbaugh-Skaife, Firms with Number of Collins and different corporate outside LaFond (2006) governance levels blockholders
, that received Quality ratings by S&P.
to contravene the purposes of the statute.
In addition, the type of ownership concentration should affect that relationship; we consider the ownership concentration of a single blockholder
as well as that of a coalition of the five largest blockholders