antitakeover statute

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Antitakeover Statute

A law at the state level prohibiting hostile takeovers in certain circumstances. Different states have different antitakeover statutes, but most involve some way of limiting a potential acquirer's ability to take a bid directly to shareholders. Critics contend that these laws can work against shareholder interest, while proponents maintain that they promote stability in publicly-traded companies. Antitakeover statutes can only apply to companies registered in states having such laws.

antitakeover statute

A state law that makes it easier for a firm based in that state to fend off a takeover hostile to the firm's management. Such a statute may actually penalize shareholders since acquisition-minded firms or individuals may be less likely to make an offer for the firm's stock.
References in periodicals archive ?
on a national exchange, (4) antitakeover statutes, (5) the right of
evidence that states with antitakeover statutes retain more in-state
Qi and Wald (2008) determine that debt holders use more debt covenants to minimize agency costs when borrowers are incorporated in states with stronger antitakeover statutes.
Therefore, our results are not influenced by the possible differences among firms in states that do and do not pass antitakeover statutes.
Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage.
Indeed, the market for incorporations has not even penalized the three states that passed severe antitakeover statutes which have been viewed as detrimental to shareholders.
State antitakeover statutes clearly apply to publicly held companies incorporated in the state.
Because managers decided where the firm incorporated, managers could now protect their jobs by incorporating in states with antitakeover statutes, and states could now boost tax revenues by providing them a haven.
If you lift the pill for us and approve our future purchases for purposes of the applicable Indiana antitakeover statutes, it would be our intention to purchase additional shares.
We create an antitakeover index and a payout restriction variable for each state to proxy for the variation in antitakeover statutes and payout restriction laws across states.
We address three different elements of statutory corporate law: the Model Business Corporation Act, antitakeover statutes, and other statutory revisions.
Similarly, a focus on the ex post/ex ante measurement problem highlights the danger of making policy judgments based on "event studies" that measure how stock prices respond when firms adopt new ATDs or when states pass new antitakeover statutes.